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A SHEEP IN WOLF'S CLOTHING: TERRITORIALISM
IN THE GUISE OF INTEREST ANALYSIS IN
COONEY v. OSGOOD MACHINERY, INC.*
Aaron D. Twerski**
INTRODUCTION
Once again the New York Court of Appeals has authored
an opinion for the casebooks. Cooney v. Osgood Machinery,
Inc.' is not the first case to raise the issue of contribution in a
conflicts setting.2 It does, however, discuss the problem in a
manner that exposes the policy questions behind the conflict in
a sharp and uncompromising fashion.
The story is simply told. In October 1978, Dennis Cooney,
a Missouri resident, was injured while working on a metal
bending machine.3 The injury occurred while he was working
for Paul Mueller Co., a Missouri domiciliary.4 The metal bend-
ing machine that caused the injury was manufactured in 1957-
58 by Kling Bros. and sold in 1958 to a Buffalo, New York
company, American Standard Inc., through a New York sales
agent, Osgood Machinery. Osgood had assisted American Stan-
dard in the setup and initial operation of the machine.5 Ameri-
can closed its Buffalo plant around 1961. Little is known as to
what happened to the machine in question from 1961 to 1969.
81 N.Y.2d 66, 612 N.E.2d 277, 595 N.Y.S.2d 919 (1993).
Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
81 N.Y.2d 66, 612 N.E.2d 277, 595 N.Y.S.2d 919 (1993).
2 See, e.g., Bader v. Purdom, 841 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1988) (conflict between
Ontario and New York law in contribution and indemnity claim); Mack Trucks v.
Bendix-Westinghouse Auto Co., 372 F.2d 18 (3d Cir. 1966) (indemnity claim impli-
cating the laws of both Pennsylvania and Florida); Nicolet, Inc. v. Superior Court,
224 Cal. Rptr. 408 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (false conflict in favor of California law in
case where asbestos manufacturer sued insurers for the insurers' failure to indem-
nify manufacturers), review granted, 719 P.2d 987 (Cal. 1986), dismissed, 736 P.2d
319 (Cal. 1987).
' Cooney, 81 N.Y.2d at 70, 612 N.E.2d at 279, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 921.
4 Id.
Id.
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However, in 1969, Crouse Company, which obtained the equip-
ment in some unknown manner, sold it to Paul Mueller Co.6
Sometime after it purchased the used machine, Mueller in-
stalled it in its Springfield, Missouri plant and modified it by
adding a foot switch.' Cooney was injured while cleaning the
machine: "The machine was running at the time-a piece of
wood having been wedged in the foot switch.... Cooney was
unable to reach the switch to stop the machine and avoid inju-
ry.,,
8
What then transpired followed a familiar pattern. Cooney
filed for and received workers' compensation benefits in Mis-
souri. But unhappy with the limited workers' compensation
benefits, he sought out Osgood, the New York sales agent in-
volved in the original sale from Kling Bros. to American Stan-
dard, as the seller of the defective product.9 Of all the parties
involved in the suit, Osgood was almost certainly the least
culpable. It immediately brought a third-party contribution
action against Mueller, American Standard and Hill Acme (the
successor in interest to Kling Bros)." Though the case does
not set forth the claim in any detail, it would appear that giv-
en the modification of the product by Mueller, Cooney's em-
ployer, it is quite likely that the lion's share of the fault would
rest with Mueller. Even if a claim of defective design could be
lodged against the manufacturer or seller, Cooney was injured
when a piece of wood became wedged in the foot switch-the
very part of the machine that Mueller had modified at the
plant site. But, consider now the rub.
Missouri, the domicile of the defendant and the locus of
the accident, follows the overwhelming majority rule that an
employer who operates under the immunity of workers' com-
pensation is not only immune from suit by the injured plain-
tiff, but is also immune from any contribution claim by any
defendant held liable to the plaintiff. This policy rests on the
theory that if the defendant is liable for contribution, its
workers' compensation immunity is illusory. It ultimately will
6 id.
7Id.
8 Id.
9Id.
10 Id.
"' Id.; see also Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.120(1) (Vernon 1993).
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be held liable for the workers' injury indirectly. In contrast,
New York, the domicile of Osgood, stands alone in allowing a
full contribution action against the employer for the percentage
of fault allotted to it.' 2 The conflict could not be any sharper.
New York is at loggerheads with the rest of the nation as to
whether an employer should be able to utilize workers' com-
pensation immunity as a shield against what otherwise would
be its liability as a joint tortfeasor.
This Article first establishes that contribution conflict of
law cases bring the interest analysis and territorialism ap-
proaches into sharp conflict. It then demonstrates that New
York's insistence upon applying an interest analysis requires it
to obscure the reality of tort immunity rules without always
ensuring the appropriate result. But this Part also concludes
that the Cooney court reached the correct result by implicitly
applying a territorial analysis. Finally, this Article examines
the constitutional implications of Osgood's argument that New
York law should apply, concluding that a territorial approach
avoids a very real constitutional problem.
I. CONTRIBUTION CONFLICT CASES AND WHY THEY ARE
DIFFERENT
Contribution cases will be a source of difficulty for the
courts in the years to come. The issue will come up with recur-
ring frequency because manufacturers, with considerable justi-
fication, view the majority no-contribution rule as unjust."3
They find it unpalatable that an employer, who is often the
most culpable of the parties, escapes scot free from liability,
thereby shifting the entire cost of the injury to the product
manufacturer. 4 Though New York is the only state to allow
12 See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. §§ 1401-04 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1993); see
also Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382
(1972) (permitting a third-party complaint against employer for apportionment of
damages).
13 See ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 76.10 (1993)
(explaining that manufacturers, as strangers to the compensation system, believe it
is unfair for them to subsidize the system by assuming liabilities that would nor-
mally be shifted to or shared with the employer); JAMES HENDERSON & AARON D.
TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILITY PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 66-69 (2d ed. 1992).
14 See INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, PRODUCT LIABILrrY CLOSED CLAIM SURVEY:
A TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS 64-66 (1977) (finding that employer
1994] 1353
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full contribution, other states have allowed partial contribution
up to the amount of the workers' compensation award."5 Un-
less this issue is resolved by federal product liability legisla-
tion, 6 contribution conflicts of this nature are here to stay.
Full or partial contribution rules will be at war with the no-
contribution rule. One's first reaction to this conflict might well
be to ask, "So what?" The law has dealt with the issue of pro-
recovery versus anti-recovery rules in a host of conflict set-
tings. A modern policy-oriented conflicts approach should easi-
ly adapt to this new problem. But there are several reasons
why it will not be easy to resolve these problems without com-
promising the principles of interest analysis.
First, in the classic contribution conflicts case, the under-
lying tortious conduct which causes injury to the plaintiff and
gives rise to the lawsuit is territorially centered in one jurisdic-
tion. 7 For example, in Cooney, the plaintiff was injured while
at work in Mueller's plant in Springfield, Missouri."
negligence is implicated in more than one-half of all employment-related product
liability claims).
15 See, e.g., Kotecki v. Cyclops Welding Corp., 585 N.E.2d 1023 (Ill. 1991) (em-
ployer liable in contribution for amount not to exceed employer's workers' compen-
sation award); Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 257 N.W.2d 679 (Minn. 1977) (con-
tribution of employer can be in proportion to its fault, but it cannot exceed
employer's workers' compensation award). Several states permit a dollar-for-dollar
offset for the employer's negligence. Witt v. Jackson, 366 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1961) (in-
jured employee's damages against third party reduced by amount of worker's com-
pensation already received); Hunsucker v. High Point Bending & Chair Co., 75
S.E.2d 768 (N.C. 1953) (same). At least one state follows the proposal of the MOD-
EL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT § 114 (1979) and permits an offset based on
worker's compensation payments without regard to whether the employer was at
fault. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572(F) (West Supp. 1982).
1" See Product Liability Fairness Act of 1993, S. 687, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. §
205(a)(3) (1994), which provides that an employer's right to recapture workers'
compensation benefits from a product liability award is preserved unless the man-
ufacturer can prove by clear and convincing evidence that the employer and/or the
claimant's co-employees were at fault in causing the employee's injuries. Id. If the
manufacturer proves that the employer was at fault, the amount of the judgement
is reduced by the amount of the workers' compensation benefits. Id.; see also Paul
C. Weiler, Worker's Compensation and Product Liability: The Interaction of a Tort
and a Non-Tort Regime, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 825, 844 (1989). The likelihood that
Congress actually will pass federal legislation remains very much in doubt. For
over a decade, efforts at enacting products liability reform at the federal level
have not met with success.
1 See, e.g., Bader v. Purdom, 841 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1988) (New York plaintiff,
while visiting Canada, was bitten by a Canadian dog; although New York arguably
has an interest in this case, the events transpired exclusively in Canada).
18 Cooney v. Osgood Mach., Inc., 81 N.Y.2d 66, 70, 612 N.E.2d 277, 279, 595
[Vol. 59:1351
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Mueller's modification of the metal bending machine also took
place at the work site.19 While the facts do not relate whether
the last owner of the used machine, Crouse Co., was a New
York domiciliary, this hardly seems relevant. Mueller had no
contact whatsoever with Osgood, the New York seller of the
defective machine. Furthermore, the contribution plaintiff,
Osgood Machinery, Inc., did nothing whatsoever to affiliate
itself with Missouri. 0 The court noted that "Osgood was not
in the business of distributing goods nationwide but limited its
activities to New York and parts of Pennsylvania."2' Accord-
ingly, contribution conflicts cases such as Cooney do not bring
into play interstate relationships involving activities of both
parties that somehow touch the concerned jurisdictions. There
is no bilateralism of any kind.22 A contribution plaintiff or
contribution defendant seeks the benefit of its favorable domi-
ciliary law based on little more than its domiciliary status.
Admittedly, this problem is not new to conflict of laws.23 What
is of special interest is that contribution cases present this
problem structurally.
Second, the contribution cases present to the courts policy
conflicts of the highest order. These are not choice-of-law prob-
lems stemming from antiquated rules that remain long past
the time that they should have passed on to the nether-
world.24 These conflicts raise the question of who ought to
N.Y.S.2d 919, 921 (1993).
19 Id.
20 Id. at 77, 612 N.E.2d at 283, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 925.
21 Id.
' See Linda J. Silberman, Federal Choice of Law Restraints, 10 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 103, 110-19 (1981).
' See, e.g., O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving, 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1034 (1978) (New York widow allowed to pursue more favorable New
York tort scheme instead of Virginia's workers' compensation scheme for the
wrongful death of her husband who was killed in a Virginia industrial accident);
Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 854 (1973)
(New York plaintiff in wrongful death action received the benefit of New York's
unlimited damage recovery rule instead of Massachusetts' $50,000 damage limit,
even though events transpired exclusively in Massachusetts).
24 See RUSSEL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws § 6.6
(3d ed. 1986) (arguing that when the conflict is between an anachronistic rule that
has been abandoned by a majority of states and a more modern rule, it is appro-
priate for a court to choose the more modern rule in a conflicts setting); see, e.g.,
Offshore Rental, Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 583 P.2d 721 (Cal. 1978) (applying
the stronger, more current Louisiana rule to preclude corporate employer from
1994] 1355
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bear the cost for institutional immunities. Indeed, this issue
was of such significance that, in writing for the Cooney court,
Judge Kaye seriously considered the argument that for New
York to deny the application of its contribution rule would be
against its fundamental public policy. 5 That she ultimately
rejected the argument does not gainsay the simple fact that
the court realized that the policy clash was exceptionally seri-
ous.
If both of these observations are correct, the contribution
cases necessarily cause courts to choose sides. The Currie
brand of interest analysis will demand that the forum apply its
own law in the case of a true conflict.26 The attempt to dimin-
ish the interest of the forum by sensitive factual analysis does
not ring true, although Judge Kaye made a valiant attempt to
mute the harshness of the conflict in Cooney.27 But the reality
is that any time an injury takes place out of state, a New York
contribution plaintiff is likely to carry the full burden of a
serious product liability claim, a result New York views as a
terrible injustice. This case, therefore, does not provide the
opportunity for New York to read its policy in a "moderate and
restrained" fashion.2" If it is to deny its plaintiff recovery, it
recovering damages caused by loss of key employee).
' Cooney, 81 N.Y.2d at 78, 612 N.E.2d at 284-85, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 926-27.
26 BRAINERD CUmiE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 119 (1963)
("The sensible and clearly constitutional thing for any court to do, confronted with
a true conflict of interests, is to apply its own law . . . simply because a court
should never apply any other law except when there is a good reason for doing
so.").
Cooney, 81 N.Y.2d at 77-78, 612 N.E.2d at 283-84, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 925-26.
Judge Kaye sought to minimize the conflict by suggesting that Osgood could not
have been certain that contribution would have been available to it in a products
liability action in the sale of industrial equipment. Id. at 77, 612 N.E.2d at 284,
595 N.Y.S.2d at 925. She argued that the original sale took place in 1958, some
14 years before the decision in Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d
288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972) (permitting contribution action against employer,
even though employer provides workers' compensation). She also emphasized the
very significant interest of the Missouri defendant who could not have expected to
be haled before a New York court to respond to damages for an accident to a
Missouri employee at its Missouri plant. Id.
28 Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
754, 757 (1963). Also, it is not likely that any of the other sophisticated methods
for resolving true conflicts, such as comparative impairment, will help when the
policy clash is as sharp as it is in this case. See William F. Baxter, Choice of Law
and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1963); Herma Hill Kay, The Use of
Comparative Impairment to Resolve True Conflicts: An Evaluation of the California
[Vol. 59:1351
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must bow to a territorial principle. That is precisely what New
York did. Ultimately, contribution cases pit interest analysis
against territorialism in its most raw and naked form. There is
no place to hide. In this "conflict" within Conflicts analysis,
courts cannot honestly pay allegiance to both regimes.
II. THE SCHULTZ FALLACY
Early in conflicts case law, courts noted the distinction
between laws that regulate primary conduct, such as standards
of care, and those that allocate losses after the tort occurs.
They reasoned that where standards of care were implicated,
lex loci delicti was almost certainly the rule of choice." How-
ever, where loss-distributing mechanisms were at stake, the
locus of the injury was of much lesser importance and the
domicile of the respective parties became the focus of the con-
flicts analysis." Critics of First Restatement rules justifiably
took issue with the tyranny of characterization.31 The recent
Experience, 68 CAL. L. REV. 577 (1980) (advocating that the California Supreme
Court should reject the comparative impairment analysis as inconsistent if it wish-
es to use Currie's methodology to resolve choice-of-law cases). Indeed, a case such
as Cooney would strain even Professor Kramer's articulation for resolving choice-of-
law problems. See Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
277 (1990) (arguing that courts should develop canons of construction to create a
multistate choice-of-law compact). Where the policy conflict reaches screeching
tones and the stakes for the respective domiciliaries are extraordinarily high, poli-
cy-oriented solutions to choice of law simply break down. One must take sides
with either Currie or a territorial approach. New York has clearly done the latter.
See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
29 See Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 482, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284, 240
N.Y.S.2d 743, 750 (1963) ("Where defendant's exercise of due care in the operation
of his automobile is in issue, the jurisdiction in which the allegedn wrongful con-
duct occurred will usually have a predominant, if not exclusive, concern.").
"' Id. at 483, 191 N.E.2d at 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 751 ("Although the rightness
or wrongness of [a] defendant's conduct may depend upon the law of the partic-
ular jurisdiction through which the automobile passes, the rights and liabilities of
the parties which stems from their guest-host relationship should remain constant
and not vary and shift as the automobile proceeds from place to place.").
3, See, e.g., ARTHUR HENRY ROBERTSON, CHARACTERIZATION IN THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS 166-67, 170 (1940); RUSSEL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 3.2 (3d ed. 1986); WALTER WHELLER COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL
BASES FOR THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 159 (1942). Critics of the First Restatement's
use of characterization as an important step in choice-of-law analysis note that
characterization identifies a problem area but allows for no fact-sensitive evalua-
tion of whether a given policy objective is furthered under the facts of the case to
be decided.
1994] 1357
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attempts by the New York Court of Appeals in Schultz v. Boy
Scouts of America, Inc. 2 and Cooney to characterize all tort
rules under the heading of either conduct-regulating or loss-
distributing is no less tyrannical. The law of torts is too finely
textured to allow for such a simplistic, bipolar categorization.
Both Schultz and Cooney demonstrate the fallacy of the
distinction. In Schultz, plaintiffs, residents of New Jersey, sued
defendants, Boy Scouts of America, to recover damages for
personal injuries to themselves and their two sons arising from
sexual molestation that took place when the two boys were at
a scouting camp in upstate New York.3" Their negligence
claim was premised upon the Boy Scouts' failure to discover
that the scoutmaster, who had molested the boys, had a histo-
ry as a sexual abuser. 4 The conflict pitted the charitable im-
munity rule of New Jersey against the law of New York, which
recognized no such immunity. The court began its analysis by
downplaying the interest of the locus of the injury:
[Wihen the jurisdictions' conflicting rules relate to allocating losses
that result from admittedly tortious conduct, as they do here, rules
such as those limiting damages in wrongful death actions, vicarious
liability rules, or immunities from suit, considerations of the State's
admonitory interest and party reliance are less important. Under
those circumstances, the locus jurisdiction has at best a minimal
interest in determining the right of recovery or the extent of the
remedy in an action by a foreign domiciliary for injuries resulting
from the conduct of a codomiciliary that was tortious under the laws
of both jurisdictions."
The attempt to negate New York's interest by labelling the
issue as loss regulating is nonsensical. That a neighboring
state can immunize with impunity its charities from the obli-
gation reasonably to discover that its employees are sex abus-
ers when the employee is charged with the task of caring for
youngsters far away from home is hardly an issue of loss dis-
tribution alone. The classic arguments against tort immunities
are that they encourage lax standards of care and, concomi-
tantly, lead to negligent conduct.36 There is every reason to
32 65 N.Y.2d 189, 480 N.E.2d 679, 491 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1985).
"3 Id. at 192, 480 N.E.2d at 681, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 92.
34 Id. at 193, 480 N.E.2d at 681, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 92.
35 Id. at 198, 480 N.E.2d at 684, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 96.
3 During the 1940s through the 1960s, many states abolished common law tort
[Vol. 59: 1351
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believe that the immunity had that very effect in Schultz. New
Jersey had every right to choose the immunity and its resul-
tant relaxation of standards of care for its residents. But must
New York recognize New Jersey's right to export sexual abus-
ers to New York's summer camps where, away from the watch-
ful eyes of parents, they are free to do their dastardly deeds? If
New York's tort law does not express an admonitory or deter-
rent goal in this case, it is hard to imagine a case where it
does.
It is not difficult to understand why the Schultz court
sought to negate the New York interest. In defending the com-
mon domicile rule in a "reverse" Babcock case," the court at-
immunities, such as charitable immunity and governmental immunities. This trend
rested upon two rationales: (1) that a loss-distribution principle forcing the victim,
rather than the negligent party, to bear the cost of his or her injury is unfair, see,
e.g., Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n, 381 P.2d 107, 112 (Ariz. 1963) (refusing
to reaffirm a rule "that denies recovery to one injured by reason of negligent
maintenance of the highway"), and (2) that immunity from liability fosters negli-
gence. The latter rationale was well stated by Justice Rutledge's leading opinion
concerning the abolishment of immunities: "[T]he tendency of immunity to foster
neglect and of liability to induce care and caution .... To offset the expense [of
liability and litigation] will be the gains of eliminating another area of what has
been called 'protected negligence.'" President and Directors of Georgetown College
v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 824, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
Other courts also have expressed concern about "protected negligence" in abol-
ishing immunities. For example, the Illinois Supreme Court reasoned, "We believe
that abolition of [school district] immunity may tend to decrease the frequency of
school bus accidents by coupling the power to transport pupils with the responsi-
bility of exercising care in the selection and supervision of the drivers." Molitor v.
Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 32, 163 N.E.2d 89 (Ill. 1959). And even the
New York Court of Appeals itself once recognized that, even if an immunity exists
for reasons of loss-distribution, negligence often will result:
Liability is the rule, immunity the exception. It is not too much to expect
that those who serve and minister to members of the public should do
so, as do all others, subject to that principle and within the obligation
not to injure through carelessness .... Insistence upon respondeat supe-
rior and damages for negligent injury serves a two-fold purpose, for it
both assures payment of an obligation to the person injured and gives
warning that justice and the law demand the exercise of care.
Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 666, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 10-11 (1957)
(emphasis added).
The New York Court of Appeals would do well to rediscover this rationale
and recognize that simply labeling an immunity as loss-distributive ignores the
reality that, in not punishing tortious conduct, the immunity fosters negligence.
" In Babcock v. Johnson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1963), the parties with the common domicile resided in a "recovery state" and the
injury occurred in a "no recovery state." Id. at 476-77, 191 N.E.2d at 280, 240
N.Y.S.2d at 745. The court permitted recovery because, under classical analysis,
1994]
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tempted to demonstrate that both Babcock and the "reverse"
Babcock were false conflict cases. If not, then Rule 1 of New
York's Neumeier conflicts resolution system could not be count-
ed on to resolve conflicts.38 Indeed, if territorial considerations
would become relevant in a common domicile fact pattern, not
only was Rule 1 of doubtful value, but even cases such as
Tooker v. Lopez39 might require reexamination. One then
could argue, for example, that the state in which all of the
events giving rise to the lawsuit transpired might well have an
interest in applying its host-guest rule to give effect to its
the state of the injury has no interest in applying its no-recovery rule to foreign
domiciliaries; its no-recovery rule was not designed to encourage negligent conduct.
In the "reverse" Babcock case, the parties with the common domicile reside in the
no-recovery state and the injury occurs in a recovery state. See, e.g., Tooker v.
Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 571, 249 N.E.2d 394, 395, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519, 520 (1969).
The argument in favor of the common domicile rule in both instances is much
more plausible when the case involves a host-guest rule. It is difficult to imagine
a host exercising greater care in driving merely because his or her conduct takes
place in a recovery state. If an accident occurs, the host and the guest will both,
so to speak, go over the cliff together. In the Schultz case, however, New York's
deterrent policy, holding foreign charities liable for negligent supervision of em-
ployees sent into the state t minister to minors who are domiciliaries of the same
state, may well have a substantial deterrent effect. Criminal penalties against a
sexual molester alone, on the other hand, will hardly be a sufficient deterrent to
the charitable employer who will bear the sting neither civilly nor criminally un-
der the rules promulgated by Schultz.
" In Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64
(1972), the court proposed the following three principles for resolving cases involv-
ing a conflict between guest statutes, which subsequently have been used for re-
solving other tort conflicts as well. Rule 1 provides that if the plaintiff and defen-
dant share a common domicile, that state's law should apply. Rule 2 provides that
if the injury takes place in the defendant's home state and that state's law pro-
tects the defendant, or if the injury takes place in the plaintiffs home state and
that state's law protects the plaintiff, then the law of the place of the injury
should apply. Finally, Rule 3 provides that in all cases not covered by Rules 1 or
2, the law of the place of the injury should apply unless different law "will ad-
vance the relevant substantive law purposes without impairing the smooth working
of the multi-state system or producing great uncertainty for litigants." Id. at 128,
286 N.E.2d at 457-58, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
Although Neumeier was developed through interest analysis reasoning, in
practice it represents a territorialist approach. Except when both parties are from
the same state (Rule 1), every conflicts case is resolved by applying the law of the
place of the injury, unless the difficult out-clause of Rule 3 is met.
" Tooker, 24 N.Y.2d at 569, 249 N.E.2d at 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 519 (holding
that New York law, not Michigan's guest statute, was applicable in an action to
recover for the death of a guest passenger, a New York domiciliary, where the
host automobile was registered and insured in New York and operated by a New
York domiciliary in Michigan).
1360 [Vol. 59:1351
A SHEEP IN WOLFS CLOTHING
policy of discouraging fraudulent collusion.4" Thus, for the
court in Schultz, it was far better to negate any locus interests
by labelling them as mere loss-distribution rules and, thus,
treating them as of second-order importance. This would res-
cue Neumeier Rule 1 and retain the conflicts resolution system
within the bounds of classic interest analysis.
The Cooney court preceded its discussion of interest analy-
sis with a similar peroration to the fact that the conflict did
not involve conduct-regulating rules:
Contribution rules-as involved in the present case-are loss allocat-
ing, not conduct regulating. Had conduct regulating been at issue
here, our analysis would be greatly simplified, for the traditional
rule of lex loci delicti almost invariably obtains.... Instead, our
analysis is necessarily more complicated, calling upon us to evaluate
the relative interests of jurisdictions with conflicting laws and, if
neither can be accommodated without substantially impairing the
other, finding some other sound basis for resolving the impasse.41
Unlike in Schultz, however, characterizing the issue as loss-
regulating did not detrimentally affect the resolution of the
case, because the court ultimately decided the case utilizing
territorial principles. Nevertheless, the characterization was
equally faulty. In discussing Missouri's interest in protecting
employers covered by workers' compensation from contribution,
the court noted that to negate this interest "would frustrate
the efforts of that state to restrict the cost of industrial acci-
dents and to afford a fair basis for predicting what these costs
will be."42 States that are prepared to deny contribution have
consciously chosen to trade high-profile tort deterrence for a
much lower cost system of workers' compensation that provides
low-level recoveries to plaintiffs. No one doubts that an em-
ployer who operates without the threat of tort recovery and
sits under the protection of workers' compensation immunity
has a reduced incentive to accomplish safety vis-a-vis industri-
al machinery in the workplace. It is thus simply not true that
both states recognize that the conduct is "admittedly tortious."
An immunity rule grants the immunized party license to act in
"' Aaron D. Twerski, Neumeier v. Kuehner: Where are the Emperor's Clothes?,
1 HoFsTRA L. REv. 104 (1973.
4, Cooney v. Osgood Mach., Inc., 81 N.Y.2d 66, 74-75, 612 N.E.2d 277, 282, 595
N.Y.S.2d 919, 924 (1993).
42 Id.
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a tortious manner and often egregiously so. That a locus state
has done so because it seeks to foster a loss-distribution goal
does not change the reality that it has eased its conduct-regu-
lating rule.
In spite of New York's failed attempt to resolve this case
by categorizing the nature of the interests at stake, the court
reached the correct result because the Neumeier rules are
essentially territorial in nature, and because the court recog-
nized that there was no legitimate reason to apply New York
law to what is almost entirely a Missouri fact situation. Never-
theless, New York conflicts jurisprudence would be enhanced if
the court were to rid itself of the conduct-regulating and loss-
distribution dichotomy; it rings hollow and adds little to
thoughtful analysis. In Schultz, it blocked the court from grap-
pling with a very real and most serious policy conflict. In
Cooney, it led the court through a needless, circuitous route to
resolving the conflict.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROL OF CHOICE OF LAW
Does Cooney raise serious constitutional questions? The
defendant Mueller argued that New York's connection with the
case was so tenuous that a decision to apply New York law
would be unconstitutional. Judge Kaye thought the argument
of sufficient moment to warrant response.43 She was correct.
But after brief discussion, she concluded that given the mini-
mal standards for constitutionality set forth in Allstate Insur-
ance Co. v. Hague," application of New York law in Cooney
would have passed constitutional muster.45 Perhaps she was
correct, but Allstate and Cooney are not a perfect fit.
In Allstate, the United States Supreme Court upheld a
Minnesota court's decision to apply its own law, which mandat-
ed the stacking of overlapping coverage policies, contrary to the
law of Wisconsin. The Minnesota court did so even though the
policy was issued to a Wisconsin domiciliary, who was a pas-
senger on a motorcycle operated by a Wisconsin resident when
he was struck and killed in Wisconsin by an automobile driven
43 Id. at 70-71, 612 N.E.2d at 279-80, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 921-22.
44 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
41 Cooney, 81 N.Y.2d at 71, 612 N.E.2d at 280, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
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by another Wisconsin resident. The Supreme Court found the
aggregation of the following contacts sufficient to meet mini-
mal due process standards: "11] the decedent was employed in
Minnesota; [2] his wife, the appointed representative of the
estate, subsequently moved to Minnesota; and [3] the insur-
ance company was at all times present and doing business in
Minnesota."4
By analogy, Judge Kaye argued that the aggregation of
Mueller's contacts with New York were sufficient for New York
to apply its own law. She noted that: (1) Mueller has substan-
tial presence in New York in that Mueller does business within
the state sufficient for the assertion of jurisdiction; (2) Osgood,
the contribution plaintiff, is a New York domiciliary; and (3)
Osgood's alleged tortious conduct with respect to the machine
arose in New York, where the machine in question was or-
dered, operated for several years and eventually shipped out of
the state.47
Although at first blush there is some facial symmetry, the
parallels disappear under closer scrutiny. That Osgood's al-
leged tortious conduct took place within New York hardly
seems relevant to the fairness of applying New York contribu-
tion law to Mueller. The contribution action focuses on
Mueller's conduct in Missouri in altering the machine or other-
wise contributing to the injury through workplace negligence.
That New York might have an interest in ensuring that
Osgood does not bear the burden of Cooney's loss alone arises
not from the tortious conduct that occurred in New York, but
in its status as a New York domiciliary. Thus, the tortious
conduct within the state does not serve to create an indepen-
dent interest over and above the domiciliary status of the
plaintiff. It cannot do double duty.
Osgood's domiciliary status appears to be most directly
analogous to the employment relationship of the decedent in
Allstate with the state of Minnesota. Indeed, Osgood's status is
stronger, as he is a bona fide New York domiciliary, while the
Allstate decedent's relationship with Minnesota was only one of
employment. Once again, however, the analogy is less than
perfect. Although the domiciliary relationship of Osgood to
" Id. (citing Allstate, 449 U.S. at 313-19).
47 Cooney, 81 N.Y.2d at 71, 612 N.E.2d at 280, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
19941 1363
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
New York clearly gives New York an interest in applying its
law, it is much more difficult to bring that relationship home
to the defendant. In Allstate, the insurer provided coverage for
the decedent, who was, in effect, a two-state domiciliary. He
lived in Wisconsin near the border between Wisconsin and
Minnesota and worked in Minnesota.48 Insurers regularly in-
quire as to whether vehicles are used to commute to work and
how far the vehicles are driven on a daily basis.49 Thus, the
defendant was hardly caught by surprise when Minnesota law
was brought to bear on the case. In contrast, the defendant in
Cooney was involved in purely local conduct within the state of
Missouri. It could not reasonably expect that New York law
would apply to its workplace conduct in Missouri. Indeed, in
the choice-of-law section of the case, Judge Kaye noted this
fact.50 Such unfair surprise can raise serious constitutional
problems. It was notably absent in Allstate, but very much
present in Cooney.
Finally, the court noted that Mueller had sufficient pres-
ence in New York to be subject to general "doing business"
jurisdiction. Once again, the court drew an analogy to Allstate,
in which the Supreme Court identified the fact that Allstate
Insurance Co. was at all times doing business in Minnesota as
a factor supporting the application of Missouri law.51 But
there is an important difference between the two cases that
relates to the choice-of-law issue. In Allstate, the defendant's
presence in Minnesota concerned the very type of business that
was the subject matter of the claim." Allstate is a national
insurer selling auto insurance, the subject matter of the con-
flicts controversy. In Cooney, however, the defendant Mueller's
business in New York did not relate to the type of claim that
was the subject of the contribution claim. In short, although
the basis of jurisdiction over Allstate was formally "doing busi-
ness," the claim had an "arising under" quality to it. In Cooney,
there is nothing but naked "doing business" jurisdiction. That
is a very slender reed upon which to support the application of
New York law.
48 Allstate, 449 U.S. at 305.
41 Id. at 314-18.
5' Cooney, 81 N.Y.2d at 71, 612 N.E.2d at 280, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
51 Id.
52 Allstate, 449 U.S. at 305.
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I would conclude that had the New York court sought to
apply its own contribution law against Mueller, its holding
might well have been subject to constitutional attack. The
aggregation of contacts that supported a finding of constitu-
tionality in Allstate made it just under the wire. A significant
diminution of those contacts justifiably creates real constitu-
tional trouble.
If New York law cannot constitutionally be applied against
Mueller, however, can Missouri law constitutionally be applied
against Osgood? Does not Osgood have a similar claim that it
had no contact with Missouri? It did business only in New
York and Pennsylvania and had no contact whatsoever with
Missouri. If this is the case, then is Cooney a constitutionally
"unprovided-for" case? That is, perhaps the law of neither
jurisdiction can apply because to do so would invoke the law of
a jurisdiction that had no reasonable relation to one of the
parties. Thus, although both states have an interest in their
domiciliaries, that interest does not overcome the unfairness of
applying their law to one of the litigants.
For a confirmed territorialist such as myself, the specter
raised by such a state of events is not distressing. It leads me
back to my view that the touchstone for choice-of-law must be
territoriality.53  The contribution claim is Missouri-based
through-out and so overwhelmingly so that its law has claim to
application. That one party is a stranger to those territorial
events creates no inherent problem. A state that was the locus
of the events relevant to a dispute has the right to speak to its
fair resolution. No apologies are necessary. Fairness requires
me to admit, however, that even true believers in interest
analysis have a way out of this conundrum. A plaintiff seeking
to recover against a defendant must present a claim with law
applicable to the defendant to make out a case. 4 Thus, it is
Aaron D. Twerski, On Territoriality and Sovereignty: System Shock and Con-
stitutional Choice of Law, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 149 (1981); Aaron D. Twerski, En-
lightened Territorialism and Professor Cavers-The Pennsylvania Method, 9 DUQ. L.
REV. 373 (1971).
" See Larry Kramer, Interest Analysis and the Presumption of Forum Law, 56
U. CHI. L. REV. 1301 (1989) (arguing that a plaintiff must present a claim with
reasonable applicable law to support the cause of action; the failure to do so in a
domestic case will support a motion to dismiss, and the same argument supports
the dismissal of plaintiffs claim in a conflicts setting).
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not that Missouri law is being applied against Osgood. Osgood
simply did not present a claim against Mueller with relevant
law that would allow for the prosecution of its claim.
CONCLUSION
Cooney is a very good decision and Judge Kaye has written
a compelling opinion. She not only has confirmed the highly
territorial Neumeier rules, but she has demonstrated why they
make good sense under the facts of the case. My plea to the
New York Court of Appeals, however, is that it disavow the
rigid labelling in which rules are characterized as either loss-
allocating or conduct-regulating. Doing so adds little to the
analysis and gives insufficient credence to the proposition that
serious limitations on remedies have a significant impact on
primary conduct. It also seems to me that the time has come to
take constitutional arguments seriously. Allstate itself
stretched due process to the limits and should not be read as
totally eviscerating the due process clause as a constraint on
state choice-of-law principles. One is hardly in "good hands"
even when within the four corners of Allstate. When the facts
are weaker than in Allstate, courts should be willing to face
the constitutional infirmities and make the unpleasant, harsh
statement that a suggested choice of law is not only bad policy
but flatly unconstitutional.
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